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Abstract
In this study, it was hypothesized that experimentally manipulated levels of power would
moderate the association of dispositional social dominance orientation (SDO) with
preferences for harsh punishment. In particular, we expected to detect a stronger
effect for dispositional SDO in the low-power condition, relying on the notion that
low power enhances sensitivity to threats to the status quo, and that high SDO individ-
uals are particularly motivated to enforce hierarchy-enhancing measures as punishment.
SDO scores were measured two months prior to the experiment, and then immediately
after the experimental session. As expected, preexperimental SDO interacted with the
power manipulation. We found stronger preexperimental SDO effects on punishment
among low-power participants. We also anticipated and found that individuals high in
SDO increased further their postexperimental SDO scores if assigned to a high-power
condition. The discussion focuses on the importance of SDO effects among low-status
groups and on how situational roles shape dispositional self-descriptions.
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Punishment has been a topic widely discussed in psychology and is relevant for
research and theory in several areas (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002;
Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010; Podsakoﬀ, Bommer, Podsakoﬀ, & MacKenzie, 2006;
Wenzel & Okimoto, 2016). The importance of punishment for individuals and
human groups can be traced back to an evolutionary account that emphasizes
how groups (as hunter-gatherer societies) needed to install punishment mechan-
isms to check free-riders and, as well, to deter disloyal behaviors that put the
social order at risk (Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016). Such accounts are con-
sistent with the deﬁnition of punishment as a device used to reduce the prob-
ability of undesired behaviors. This deﬁnition, in turn, straightforwardly
explains why punishment dynamics is a key topic in organizational (e.g.,
Podsakoﬀ et al., 2006), justice-related (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Okimoto &
Wenzel, 2008), and criminal and legal psychology research (e.g., Kemmelmeier,
2005; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994).
Organizational studies have tackled the dynamics of punishment from the
perspective of organizational eﬃciency, the role of management eﬀectiveness in
administering rewards and punishments, and the dynamics of manager–employee
relationships and perceptions (Podsakoﬀ et al., 2006). Research on justice has
investigated the roles of moral emotions and other motives (retribution vs. utili-
tarianism or retribution vs. restoration) in determining punishment (e.g.,
Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2016). It should be noted that
both organizational and justice-related research on punishment share a favorable
functional evaluation of punishment systems. They can be interpreted as social
devices selected by evolutionary processes with predominantly positive conse-
quences for the functioning of groups (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011;
Gollwitzer & Van Prooijen, 2016). As a point of diﬀerence, legal and judicial
psychology research has somewhat emphasized the biases linked with how and on
whom punishment systems operate, thus considering a darker side of punishment
within and between social groups (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999). For instance, a large body of research has focused on group-
level variables as ethnicity and status to account for biases in the degree of rec-
ommended punishment. This literature in general emphasizes a proclivity to
administer harsher punishment to members of ethnic minorities with lower
status and, in general, to lower status out-groups (e.g., Gross & Mauro, 1989).
This notwithstanding, biases in the opposite direction (disfavoring the in-group
member for the out-group member) also have been identiﬁed. In research on the
so-called black sheep eﬀect, it has been found that in-group oﬀenders are pun-
ished more harshly than out-group oﬀenders (e.g., Gollwitzer & Keller, 2010).
Such an eﬀect appears to be asymmetrical across high- and low-power groups: In
low-power groups, individuals seem to punish more harshly in-group members,
as compared with high-power groups (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). However,
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such group-level eﬀects on punishment appear highly variable. For instance, it
has been shown that the black sheep eﬀect could be reversed under some circum-
stances (e.g., Van Prooijen, 2006). As well, after contradictory results on the issue
of ethnic bias in judicial decisions accumulated over the years, it appeared that no
unqualiﬁed systematic association between ethnicity- and status-related factors
and harsh punishment could be found (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994).
Such diﬃculties in detecting consistent group-level eﬀects on preferences for
harsh punishment have provided motivation to look for individual-level variables
that could explain preferences for harsh punishment. On this score, social dom-
inance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwarth, & Malle, 1994) has been
consistently identiﬁed as an individual-level correlate of preferences for harsh
punishment (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1994; Capps, 2002). Perhaps more interestingly,
SDO has been shown to interact with group-level variables in shaping punish-
ment and derogation (Kemmelmeier, 2005; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, &
Federico, 1998; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). For instance,
social dominance has helped to better understand the null eﬀects of ethnicity
frequently found in mock jury research, showing that when the defendant was
white, higher SDO predicted less severe sentences but this relationship was
reversed when the defendant was black (Kemmelmeier, 2005). Failing to consider
the interaction with individual-level SDO could wrongly suggest that diﬀerences
in status and ethnicity would have simply no eﬀect on punishment preferences.
Thus, SDO has been interpreted as an individual-level variable interacting with
group-level variables in shaping preferences for harsh punishment andother deter-
minations (Levin et al., 1998; Sidanius et al., 2004). In a similar vein, we would
argue that the eﬀects of SDO on preferences for harsh punishment would not be
constant across a key group-level variable, i.e., levels of power. Punishment has
been related in various and complex ways to varying levels of power (Fiddick &
Cummins, 2007; Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). It appears therefore important to
study the possible interaction of levels of power, as a manipulated group-level
variable, and SDO as an individual-level variable in shaping preferences for
harsh punishment. We would anticipate that the eﬀects of SDO on preferences
for harsher punishment would be stronger when individuals are placed in low-
power contingencies, while the eﬀects of SDO would become weaker when indi-
viduals are placed in high-power contingencies. Before turning to a more detailed
description of the rationale sustaining such expectations, wewill ﬁrst brieﬂy review
the associations of SDO and levels of power with preferences for punishment.
Levels of power and punishment
Following Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003), we adhere to a deﬁnition of
power as an ‘‘individual’s relative capacity to modify others’ states by providing
or withholding resources or administering punishment’’ (p. 265). As can be
noted, the deﬁnition of power we adopt has at its core the ability to administer
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punishment. From this deﬁnition, it also follows that those in power would be
more frequently demanded by the circumstances and by their roles to administer
punishment to modify others’ states and behaviors, as it is the case in organiza-
tions, political and policy settings, and the like. However, the fact that the
powerful have means and opportunities to administer punishment does not
necessarily imply that wielding power per se entails preferences for harsher
forms of punishment. On the contrary, research has identiﬁed various factors
that could lead those low in power to resort to punishment. Consider, for
instance, situations where deviance represents a threat, and punishment may
be imposed as a way of dealing with that threat. Because it has been shown
that perceptions of personal threat occur more frequently in low-status groups
(Keltner et al., 2003; Scheepers & Ellemers, 2005), it could be fairly easily argued
that in the eyes of lower status individuals, compared with higher status indi-
viduals, the threatening transgressors could appear more menacing and danger-
ous. Given that threat’s prime motivations to punish (e.g., Wenzel & Okimoto,
2016), it is conceivable that disempowered groups may feel a strong desire,
underpinned by fear and perceptions of danger, for harsher retribution (e.g.,
Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). Instead, compared with low-power individuals,
powerful individuals can aﬀord to be relatively unconcerned about deviants or
free-riders because their powerful position can make many forms of mild devi-
ance unthreatening, particularly when the free-rider or transgressor belongs to a
low-power category (Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007). The resilience of high-power
individuals to the social threat embodied by deviants and transgressors has been
found to endure in their tolerant attitude toward free-riders, as indicated in a few
studies. Van Prooijen and Lam (2007) found that high status leads to milder
punishment of out-group members compared with low status, and Fiddick and
Cummins (2007) found that high-power individuals were less punitive toward
transgressors. Such preference for leniency could be interpreted as a preference
by high-power individuals or groups to conform to norms of magnanimity
toward subordinates, the so-called ‘‘noblesse oblige’’ norm, which inhibits
high-power groups or individuals from resorting to harsher—even though legit-
imate—forms of punishment (Fiddick, Cummins, Janicki, & Erlich, 2013).
To summarize, research on power and relative-group power appears to indi-
cate that, in general, diﬀering levels of power impact on preferences for harsh
versus lenient forms of punishment (Fiddick et al., 2013). More speciﬁcally,
research on this issue does not appear to point to the simple conclusion that
high power motivates harsher punishment. Rather, the contrary seems to be the
case: Low-power groups appear more motivated to punish deviance instead
(Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Van Prooijen & Lam, 2007;
Wenzel & Okimoto, 2016). However, it must be noted that the notion of a simple
stronger preference for harsher punishment by low-power groups or individuals
does not provide a reliable picture of the complex eﬀects on punishment of
power and status, because these eﬀects could take opposite directions
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(Kafashan, Sparks, Griskevicius, & Barclay, 2014). Besides, inferring a general-
ized tolerance and leniency toward transgressors by high-power individuals does
not readily ﬁt with well-established theoretical models, such as the inﬂuential
social dominance theory, that emphasize instead the systematic use of punish-
ment and other forms of control by the powerful to maintain the hierarchical
status quo (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Finally, focusing only on the main
eﬀects of power on punishment ignores the importance of variation across indi-
viduals in their preference for hierarchy-enhancing attitudes and behaviors as
key in shaping reactions to deviance (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2004).
Social dominance and punishment
SDO, deﬁned as the individuals’ preference for inequality and hierarchy among
social groups and individuals, has been associated with preference for harsher
punishment and more frequent reliance on punishment to deal with transgres-
sions (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994). Individuals high in SDO are motivated to punish
to enforce norms that sustain a hierarchical status quo and defend their status
position from challenging threats. Consistent with such reasoning, associations
between higher levels of SDO with both punitiveness scores and support for
harsher forms of punishment have been found (e.g., Capps, 2002). A straight-
forward (main eﬀect or zero-order) correlation between individual diﬀerences
in SDO and preferences for harsher punishment for transgressors who are per-
ceived to be competitive and, hence, a potential threat to the established hier-
archical arrangement (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009) is thoroughly consistent with the
SDO deﬁnition. It is also consistent with the wider social dominance theory,
which includes SDO as an individual diﬀerence variable (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Notwithstanding such reliable zero-order (main eﬀects) associations
between SDO and preferences for harsher punishment, it should be emphasized
that social dominance theory (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) allows for more
complex patterns of associations that conceptualize SDO eﬀects as contingent
on situational, institutional, and group-level phenomena (Sidanius et al., 2004).
Otherwise put, the social context may moderate the inﬂuences of SDO.
The case for interactions between SDO and levels of power
Pratto et al. (1994) speciﬁed that social dominance eﬀects are not bound to occur
only in the guise of simple or main eﬀects. Rather, ‘‘social dominance theory
implies that SDO and other individual variables must be considered within their
social context’’ (p. 757). Power is one important feature of a wide array of social
contexts. SDO, which captures also the individual’s attentiveness to the social-
hierarchical arrangements at hand in each given situation, might consequently
exert its eﬀects quite diﬀerently in low- vs. high-power situations (Levin &
Sidanius, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius et al., 2004). An instantiation
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of such an interaction has been reported by Kemmelmeier (2005), who found
that white (high status) participants in a mock-jury showed opposite eﬀects of
SDO on punishment contingent on the relative status of the defendant (black or
white): High levels of SDO led to more lenient punishment for white defendants,
but to harsher punishments in the case of black defendants. One could more
generally assert that individual levels of social dominance could play very dif-
ferent roles depending on the power contingencies at hand. In Kemmelmeier’s
(2005) case, SDO motivated harsher punishment of black (low status) defend-
ants by white (higher status) participants so as to foster the hierarchy-enhancing
motives that underpin individual diﬀerences in social dominance (e.g., Pratto
et al., 1994). But in other cases, diﬀerent interactions between SDO and group-
level variables may materialize. According to social dominance theory (e.g.,
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and speciﬁcally its so-called ‘‘asymmetry hypothesis,’’
the eﬀects of SDO become stronger among lower status or low-power groups.
Individuals with high levels of social dominance who nonetheless belong to low-
power groups may fail to show the typical in-group favoritism in judging a
deviant peer and would rather judge the in-group deviant more harshly as a
means to redress a perceived menace to a hierarchy-enhancing arrangement
(Sidanius et al., 2004). Following such a framework, we anticipate that SDO
interacts with level of power; further, the shape of such interaction is consistent
with the asymmetry hypothesis of social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999), with high SDO being more strongly associated with punishment of group
members in the low-power group than in the high-power group.
Effects of power on SDO
We also derived a secondary hypothesis using social dominance theory.
This hypothesis anticipates that power moderates the eﬀects of preexperimental
SDO on postexperimental SDO. More speciﬁcally, we expect those high in SDO
andwho enjoy a high-power condition to further increase their levels of SDO. This
expectation appears consistent with research showing that social categorizations
linked with higher power or status increases social dominance preferences (e.g.,
Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Levin & Sidanius, 1999), and
that exercising power fosters the expression of power-enhancing attitudes and
dispositions (Keltner et al., 2003). We add to this framework that such eﬀects
should be particularly strong for individuals already at high levels of SDO. This
hypothesis might appear inconsistent with the notion that SDO is a relatively
stable disposition considered by some as a personality trait (e.g., Pratto et al.,
1994; Snyder & Cantor, 1998) and, as such, relatively unresponsive to situational
factors. However, as mentioned before, social dominance theory explicitly allows
for interactions of SDOwith situational contingencies (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999) as well as adjustments of SDO levels to changes in the hierarchical
arrangements (Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Sidanius et al., 2004). Consistent with this,
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it has been shown that dominant and powerful positions and contingencies
increase SDO levels (Guimond et al., 2003; Levin & Sidanius, 1999). Thus, we
anticipate a ﬁt between preexperimental levels of social dominance, being assigned
to a high-power position, and increased postexperimental SDO levels. In other
words, associations between preexperimental and postexperimental SDO scores
should be stronger for those assigned to a high-power condition.
The current study
We hypothesized an interaction between a measured disposition (SDO) and a
manipulated contingency (low- vs. high-power). These were the independent vari-
ables. We anticipated that the interactions would aﬀect preferences for harsher
punishment and postexperimental levels of social dominance. These were the
dependent variables. Thus, SDO was measured twice, two months before the
experimental session (preexperimental SDO, or pre-SDO) and then again imme-
diately after the experiment (postexperimental SDO, or post-SDO). Note that
preexperimental SDO was conceived as an independent variable, while postexperi-
mental SDO played the role of dependent variable. In the experimental setting, we
ﬁrst randomly assigned participants to a low-power or a high-power condition,
and then presented to participants a description of an ambiguous target, a ﬁctio-
nalized person, that could be perceived as a free-rider. The task was to decide what
kind of punishment should be administered to that person.
We expected SDO dispositional eﬀects to be moderated by the power role
played by the participants. Situational sensitivity to threats (low-power) and
dispositional attention to status threats (high-SDO) should compound each
other, leading to stronger SDO eﬀects on punishment in the low-power com-
pared with the high-power condition. As a secondary hypothesis, we also
expected that experiencing high power would lead individuals with an already
strong orientation to social dominance to further increase their level of SDO.
More formally and empirically stated:
H1: Preexperimental SDO would interact with the power condition in aﬀecting
punishment preferences; in particular, stronger eﬀects of preexperimental SDO
on harsher punishment preferences would be observed in the low-power condition,
compared with the high-power condition;
H2: Preexperimental SDO would interact with the power condition in aﬀecting
postexperimental SDO; speciﬁcally, postexperimental SDO would increase in the
high-power condition, but particularly so for participants with high scores in pre-
experimental SDO.
Hypotheses were tested by means of moderated regression analyses (e.g., Aiken,
West, & Reno, 1991). This method appeared adequate for testing interactions in
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designs where a manipulated independent variable—power—was expected to inter-
act with a measured disposition—SDO (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013).
Method
Participants and procedure
A total of 120 Italian undergraduates (102 females, 18 males, mean age 24.2, SD
3.77) participated in exchange for course credit.1 Individual diﬀerences in SDO
were ﬁrst measured online (pre-SDO). The online questionnaire was presented as
a study about personality, and, more speciﬁcally as a project focusing on
the structure of personal preferences and opinions on social relations among
diﬀerent groups and individuals. Eight weeks later, participants came to the
laboratory for the experimental session. Participants were told that the purpose
of the research was to investigate the eﬀects of cognitive load on decision-
making. The two-month gap separating measurement of SDO from the experi-
mental session, and the diﬀerent cover stories, appear suitable to limit demand
characteristics and to reduce biases that could artiﬁcially inﬂate the disposition-
by-situation interaction we tested. In the laboratory, participants were asked to
complete a series of tasks on a computer. After some sociodemographic ques-
tions, a message appeared on screen introducing a series of arithmetical calcu-
lations to be solved (purportedly to induce cognitive load, as per the cover
story). Instructions also speciﬁed that after the arithmetical task, participants
would be presented with a business case about which they would be asked to
make a decision. After the arithmetical task, which lasted about 10 minutes,
participants were randomly assigned to the high-power or low-power conditions
(see below). A description of an ambiguously deviant member of an organization
was then presented (see below). Finally, participants responded to the dependent
variables (punishment preferences and postexperimental SDO). They were then
thanked and debriefed. All materials and measures were in Italian.
Of the 120 individuals who participated in the online data collection, 107
attended the experimental session eight weeks later. However, 11 participants
incorrectly identiﬁed their experimental condition (see below); they were there-
fore dropped from the analyses. In addition, two participants rendered incom-
plete responses to the postexperimental SDO scale, leaving a ﬁnal N of 94 (50 in
the high-power condition and 44 in the low-power condition). A one-sample chi-
square test revealed that the diﬀerential attrition across conditions could be
attributed to chance (2(1)¼ 0.375, p¼ .54). Considering a low-to-moderate
eﬀect size for the expected interactions (f2¼ .08) (e.g., Faul, Erdelfer, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) and a¼ .05, power reached .80 for this sample.
Manipulation. Drawing from Pitesa and Thau (2013), the participants were
told that they would be presented with a description of an employee’s behavior
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(‘‘Mr. Rossi’’) and that a decision should be taken on how the ﬁrm should react
to the employee’s actions. In the high-power condition, the participants were
told that they would be the ﬁnal decision-makers, having ﬁnal say on the matter.
Participants in the high-power condition could either pick one of the punishment
options available or provide a choice of his/her own; in all cases, the partici-
pant’s choice would be the ﬁnal decision on the issue. In contrast, in the low-
power condition, participants were told that they would be consulted on the
course of action to be taken on the employee’s behavior, but that they would not
be the eﬀective decision-makers: their preference would be contemplated by the
decision-makers but would not necessarily be implemented. Such low-power and
high-power conditions conform to the deﬁnition of power as a capacity to
modify others’ states by providing or withholding resources or administering
punishment (Keltner et al., 2003). Participants in the high-power condition
would therefore display a higher capacity to administer punishments, while par-
ticipants in the low-power condition would have relatively lower capacity to
administer punishments.
Target description. The following description of Mr. Rossi was presented:
Mr. Rossi is a relatively junior employee but nonetheless one of the best perform-
ing, always over-performing the ﬁrm’s targets and often doubling the sales of the
average colleague. Recently, Mr. Rossi has reduced his days at work, showing up at
the oﬃce 2–4 days a week. Some colleagues are irritated by this. Some also com-
plain that Mr. Rossi’s market zone is more proﬁtable than theirs; hence, Mr. Rossi
manages to outperform the targets while putting in fewer hours. No solid proof for
these allegations has been provided. Mr. Rossi retorts that the hours at the oﬃce do
not matter, targets matter. Notwithstanding this, some colleagues have asked for
Mr. Rossi to be punished because—they declare—Mr. Rossi works another job in
the time he is absent from the oﬃce.
This description was deliberately ambiguous: Mr. Rossi had not violated any
formal norm. Presenting a patent breach in normative behavior would reduce
the variance in the preferences for punishment. A clear breach of a formal
group-norm would make most participants feel norm-bound to express the
need for a punitive option, because breaching formal group-norms would
elicit a prescriptive focus that would override any possible eﬀect due to individ-
ual diﬀerences (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Taboada, 1998; Pinto, Marques,
Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Therefore, ambiguity of the scenario is crucial to
make room for eﬀects that originate from assuming a role (the manipulation)
or from individual diﬀerences in traits, attitudes, and dispositions. Such ambigu-
ous descriptions of free-riding behaviors have been used before in research on
norm violation in intra-group and intergroup contexts (e.g., Baumert & Schmitt,
2009; Granot, Balcetis, Schneider, & Tyler, 2014).
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Measures
Manipulation check. The deﬁnition of power we rely on (see Keltner et al., 2003)
implied that power brings about perceptions of agency, responsibility for deci-
sions, and the notion that one’s decisions are eﬀective and inﬂuence the state
of aﬀairs as intended. Consequently, we used as manipulation check ratings
(7-point scales) of how much the participants felt their role was ‘‘active,’’
‘‘responsible,’’ and ‘‘crucial,’’ in bringing about the decision. The composite
score proved reliable (a¼ .79). We expected higher scores in this composite in
the high-power condition compared with the low-power condition.
We also checked whether the participants had correctly understood the role
assigned to them (the manipulation) by clicking on one of two options (‘‘I am
the eﬀective decision-maker on the matter of Mr. Rossi’’ or ‘‘I would be con-
sulted in the matter of Mr. Rossi, but I am not the eﬀective decision-maker’’)
that were displayed after the power manipulation was presented.
Social dominance orientation. We measured SDO with the validated Italian version
(Aiello, Chirumbolo, Leone, & Pratto, 2005) of Pratto et al.’s (1994) 16-item
scale. This Italian validation of SDO has been shown to be reliable and valid and
has been used in several publications (e.g., Leone, Desimoni, & Chirumbolo,
2014; Leone, Livi, & Chirumbolo, 2016). SDO was administered at the pretest
(pre-SDO; a¼ .87) and, as mentioned above, at the end of the experimental
session two months later (post-SDO; a¼ .86). Test–retest reliability in this
sample was satisfactory (.75).
Preference for harsh punishment. The following ﬁve punitive options varying in
their degree of harshness were presented: (1) ‘‘no punishment whatsoever,’’ (2)
‘‘no punishment but an informal suggestion to spend more time at the ﬁrm,’’ (3)
‘‘suspend Rossi for a short period,’’ (4) ‘‘withhold Rossi’s bonuses,’’ and (5) ‘‘ﬁre
Rossi.’’ Five-point disagree–agree ratings were collected. The items were aver-
aged by reversing the scores for the lenient options (items 1 and 2). Therefore,
higher scores indicated preference for harsher forms of punishment. Reliability
was satisfactory (a¼ .78).
Results
As a check of the eﬃcacy of the manipulation, we found that, as expected,
participants in the high-power condition felt more active, responsible, and crucial
in the aggregate summarizing these ratings (M¼ 3.63, SE¼ .11) than partici-
pants (M¼ 3.31, SE¼ .11) in the low-power condition (t(92)¼ 2.01, p¼ .048,
95% C.I. for the diﬀerence [.001, .63]). Admittedly though, the eﬀect detected
on the manipulation check was weak.
Table 1 reports intercorrelations among variables. The table also summarizes
descriptive statistics for males and females. Preference for harsher punishment
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was not signiﬁcantly correlated with the manipulated power condition, nor with
pre- or post-SDO scores. Both SDO scores were unrelated to the manipulated
power condition. In particular, the association between pre-SDO and the
manipulated power condition was virtually zero, attesting the eﬀectiveness of
the random assignment to conditions in rendering equal pre-SDO levels across
groups. Unsurprisingly, pre- and post-SDO scores were tightly correlated.
To test hypotheses H1, we regressed the preferences for harsher punishment
on pre-SDO scores, the power manipulation (eﬀect-coded: 1 for low-
power;+1 for high-power), and their interaction (e.g., Aiken et al., 1991;
Cohen et al., 2013). All variables were standardized. The main eﬀect for the
manipulation was in the direction of stronger preferences for harsh punishment
in the low-power condition, yet the coeﬃcient was small and well above the
conventional signiﬁcance threshold (b¼.14, SE¼ .10, p¼ .17). A positive
but small and nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcient was also found for the main eﬀect of
pre-SDO on punishment (b¼ .13, SE¼ .098, p¼ .19). More germane to our
hypothesis H1, the interaction of SDO with the power manipulation was sup-
ported (b¼.22, SE¼ .098, p¼ .027). The interactive eﬀect indicated that the
associations of SDO were moderated by the levels of the power manipulation.
To clarify the shape of the interaction, we performed simple slope analyses (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 2013). Simple slopes revealed that no eﬀect for pre-SDO could be
found in the high-power condition (b¼.09, SE¼ .14, p¼ .51), while increases
in pre-SDO translated into stronger preferences for harsher punishment in the
low-power condition (b¼ .35, SE¼ .10, p¼ .01). The pattern of predicted means
in punishment across power conditions and levels of SDO (Figure 1) graphically













Preexperimental SDO .14 1
Power manipulation .14 .00 1
Postexperimental SDO .08 .75** .06 1
Females M (SD) 2.54 (.84) 2.43 (.91) – 2.39 (.88)
Males M (SD) 2.98 (.87) 3.09 (.92) – 2.82 (.66)
Total M (SD) 2.59 (.85) 2.51 (.93) – 2.44 (.86)
Note. SDO: Social Dominance Orientation; Power manipulation: coded 0 for low power and 1 for high
power.
**p< .05.
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conveys the meaning of the interaction: Only in the low-power condition did
increases in pre-SDO signiﬁcantly increase preferences for harsh punishment.
Turning to our second hypothesis (H2), we focused on postexperimental
SDO. The hypothesis anticipated that individuals high in preexperimental
SDO would further increase their postexperimental SDO levels, but particularly
so in the high-power condition. We, therefore, regressed standardized postex-
perimental SDO scores (the dependent variable) on standardized preexperimen-
tal SDO scores, the experimental condition, and their interaction. No eﬀect was
observed for the power condition (b¼ .04, p¼ .47). Pre-SDO was related with
post-SDO across conditions (b¼ .75, p< .001). More germane to hypothesis H2,
the expected pre-SDOpower condition interaction materialized (b¼ .19,
p¼ .007). Simple slopes (Cohen et al., 2013) showed that the eﬀect of pre-
SDO on post-SDO in the high-power condition was signiﬁcantly stronger
(b¼ .95, p< .001) than in the low-power condition (b¼ .58, p< .001). Figure 2
displays the predicted means for 1 SD around pre-SDO levels in the two con-
ditions, showing that increases in postexperimental SDO levels due to variations
in preexperimental SDO were steeper in the high-power condition, compared
with the low-power condition.
Discussion
We expected—and found—stronger dispositional eﬀects of SDO on punishment
in a low-power condition. We also expected—and found—that being in a high-
power contingency would increase the association between preexperimental and
postexperimental SDO scores. To put it diﬀerently, the high-power contingency
moved up postexperimental SDO scores only for those with high levels of pre-
experimental SDO. The ﬁrst ﬁnding revealed that being in a relatively low-power
Figure 1. Preference for punishment (z-scores) in the two power conditions, at high
(1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of SDO.
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contingency did not prevent translating personal preferences for dominance into
coercive practices. Instead, situational low power facilitated the unleashing of
personal dominance on increased preferences for punishment. The second ﬁnd-
ing supported the claim that power could buttress the individual’s dominance
disposition. With some latitude, one might infer from this result that power
exerts a corruptive inﬂuence (Keltner et al., 2003), but only for those sensitive
to dominance and status.
The revenge of the weak
The results are important for understanding the interplay of situational con-
straints and individual diﬀerences in choosing punishment. The dispositional
eﬀects of SDO on punishment became strong only when compounded with a
relatively low-power status. This is consistent with SDO triggering a motivated
resort to punishment to deal with threats to the status quo (e.g., Pratto et al.,
1994) and with the idea that SDO motivates retaliation against perceived com-
petitors (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), particularly so among those more vulnerable to
competition (i.e., low-power individuals). If some latitude for speculation might be
allowed, this might contribute to the current success of populist political move-
ments and leaders in harnessing antiminority attitudes among constituencies self-
describing as disempowered. This may reﬂect the enhanced sense of threat that
those depicted as free-riders, cheaters, or ‘‘deviants’’ elicit among those who feel
left behind. Such forms of backlash against deviants would become stronger for
individuals who also hold hierarchy-enhancing attitudes as social dominance and
authoritarianism. In eﬀect, it appears that a plurality of supporters of populist
movements and candidates hold such attitudes and socio-ideological postures
(Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Eiermann, 2016; Oliver & Rahn, 2016).
Figure 2. Postexperimental SDO (z-scores) in the two power conditions, at high (1 SD
above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean) levels of preexperimental SDO.
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The dominance of the powerful
The results also revealed a somewhat nastier side of power, among individuals
with already high levels of dispositional social dominance. For participants
endorsing an SDO, we observed a stronger increase in postexperimental social
dominance levels in the high-power condition. This result suggests that experi-
encing power encourages the ﬁne-tuning of one’s disposition to one’s status
(e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1999). Apparently, noblesse oblige (Fiddick et al.,
2013) eﬀects are as important for the noblesse part—enjoying hierarchical
status breeds dominance (Guimond et al., 2003)—as they are for the oblige
part—the dominant is expected to show chivalrous magnanimity (Fiddick &
Cummins, 2007). The stronger consistency in pre- and postexperimental SDO
found could have operated through the greater freedom of dispositional expres-
sion associated with power, as those in power are more disinhibited and less
likely to rely on situational constraints or social desirability concerns (Keltner
et al., 2003). This supports attitude consistency, as seems to be reﬂected in the
stronger test–retest SDO stability found in the high-power condition.
Following social dominance theory (Pratto et al., 1994), this eﬀect should
stem from a motive to legitimize the power status through the adoption of
consistent dispositional postures (Pratto et al., 1994). This motive appeared
stronger among those already embracing high levels of SDO. A somewhat dif-
ferent, though not incompatible, explanation stresses that those in high-power
positions adopt higher levels of SDO, as this allows these individuals to express a
wider array of hierarchical-enhancing attitudes against lower status groups
(Guimond et al., 2003). This reasoning may be interpreted as consistent with
the notion that power—eventually—corrupts (Keltner et al., 2003) by increasing
hierarchy-enhancing attitudes (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). We only found this
eﬀect of power for those already high in SDO before the experimental manipu-
lations. This adds to the latter argument the proviso that not everyone is simi-
larly sensitive to the corruptive inﬂuence of power: Those already subscribing to
a hierarchical view on intergroup relations are more so inclined.
Limitations and conclusions
The following limitations should brieﬂy be mentioned: (a) the limited sample size
and (b) the possibility that our results are contingent on our unique method-
ology, measures, and materials. Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect detected on the manipu-
lation check was weak, and a more direct question on power-related perceptions
(‘‘How powerful did you feel?’’) may have revealed a stronger eﬀect.
The sample was gender imbalanced. Although gender eﬀects did not alter our
results, a more balanced sample would enhance generalizability. Also, our target
(Mr. Rossi) was portrayed as male. Although ‘‘Mr. Rossi’’ is idiomatically used
in Italian to refer to a generic individual (with no emphasis on gender),
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counterbalancing the gender’s target might have revealed interactions with par-
ticipants’ gender. Of course, other dispositional measures or manipulations of
power and status (Cheng, Weidman, & Tracy, 2014) may reveal diﬀerent results.
We would welcome research showing that diﬀerent manipulations and measures
reveal diﬀerent patterns of interactions between SDO and power.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our design had also some strengths. For
instance, we measured preexperimental SDO and the dependent variables in
purportedly unrelated circumstances, two months apart, and this should limit
the risks of shared method variance and other demand biases. We also predicted
two interactions with opposite signs (on punitivity, and on postexperimental
SDO), which is a pattern of ﬁndings diﬃcult to ascribe to the demand charac-
teristics of the experimental setting or to other spurious inﬂuences. It may be
noted that the two opposite interaction patterns nonetheless conform nicely with
the tenets of social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Altogether
then, the results emphasize the ﬂexibility of the social dominance construct. It
can function as a means to express stable preferences for social and interpersonal
choices (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2004; Snyder & Cantor, 1998), and it also can serve
as a malleable individual diﬀerence posture capable of adapting to shifting social
circumstances, while maintaining a consistent hierarchy-enhancing motivational
drive (Guimond et al., 2003; Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
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